FOR RELEASE: June 11, 2003
That's why the First Amendment bars Congress from interfering with religious observance, and at the same time bars Congress from forcing anyone to worship.
Similarly, the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press doesn't just bar Congress from forbidding a newspaper to publish a particular opinion. It also bars Congress from ordering a newspaper to publish that opinion.
The Supreme Court of Maine succinctly stated this fundamental principle in its 1955 Pappas v. Stacey decision: "Freedom to associate means as well freedom not to associate."
But federal labor law, like many state laws that are modeled after it, doesn't protect employees' freedom in the commonly accepted sense of the word.
It recognizes the right to join a union.
At the same time, however, it authorizes and promotes the firing of employees for refusal to join or pay dues to a union that is certified by federal bureaucrats as their "exclusive" bargaining agent.
Nowadays there are roughly 12 million working Americans who, under federal and state laws, must pay dues or so-called "fees" to union officials on pain of being fired.
However, 22 states have laws that apply the right-to-refrain principle to labor-management relations. The 22 Right to Work laws bar the firing of employees for favoring a union or for refusal to join or pay dues to a union.
If a worker's freedom to affiliate with a union merits government protection (and the overwhelming consensus is that it does), then the freedom not to affiliate with a union must be equally protected.
Otherwise, the law exits the realm of principle to allocate power to a favored group.
By protecting employees from both employers and union officials who would deny them freedom of association, a Delaware Right to Work law would prevent the exploitation of employees as a means to anyone's end.
Under current federal labor law, the individual worker's freedom to join or support a union is not contingent on his or her being in the majority within a federally-determined "bargaining unit."
Even if the employer and the majority of employees within a "bargaining unit" oppose union representation, the law does not permit them to nullify other employees' freedom to choose which private groups they financially support.
Both common sense and constitutional precedent uphold the need for this safeguard for minority rights.
As Justice Robert Jackson wrote for the U.S. Supreme Court in 1943's Board of Education v. Barnette:
"One's right to . . . free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no election."
No sensible person would label Justice Jackson as a foe of "majority rule." His ruling in no way challenged the appropriateness of majority rule in public life and within private organizations.
But nonmembers of a private organization obviously have no right to make a collective decision that its members must withdraw or withhold their financial support.
Unfortunately, as we saw above, federal labor law is inconsistent in applying this principle.
It makes the individual worker's freedom not to join or support a union contingent on his or her being in the majority within a federally-determined "bargaining unit."
If federal bureaucrats believe, based on the results of a secret-ballot election, or, more frequently, of a so-called "card check" in which union officials know how each worker "votes," that a majority of workers favor a union, then the minority lose their right to refuse to pay dues.
A Delaware Right to Work law would simply restore the balance.
If it is wrong for a majority of workers within a "bargaining unit" who oppose unionization to exercise dictatorial power over a minority who favor it, then a dictatorship of pro-union employees is also wrong.
1) A large share of them aren't qualified, as individuals, to judge whether having a union official as their monopoly-bargaining agent "benefits" them or not.In contrast, Right to Work supporters believe that workers, with exceptions so few in number as not to make a material difference, know perfectly well whether they benefit from union monopoly bargaining.
2) A large share of them are simultaneously so shortsighted and so unscrupulous that, if given a choice, they would refuse to pay dues to a union that they know does benefit them.
Forced-unionism apologists suggest that union officials cannot adequately maintain their organizations, or possibly even sustain them at all, without the legal power to force workers to pay dues.
Presumably such apologists do not mean to suggest that unions are less deserving than charities, business associations, issue-based grass-roots lobbies, and other groups that flourish with strictly voluntary support.
Therefore, they must mean that workers are for some odd reason less willing to do what's right or even act in their own enlightened self-interest than charitable givers or members of business associations and grass-roots lobbies.
To say the least, this is a peculiar outlook for the self-anointed spokesmen of a "workers' movement"!
The fact is, many employees – especially those with above-average talents and work ethics – are harmed, not helped, by union monopoly bargaining and have unimpeachable reasons for refusing to pay union dues.
Even Richard Rothstein of the AFL-CIO-funded Economic Policy Institute admitted in 1993 that "union . . . negotiated contracts reduce wage dispersion . . . by reducing pay of the most productive workers."
Because independent-minded employees have the power to penalize Big Labor's irresponsible class-warfare tactics by resigning from a union and withholding their dues, in Right to Work states union bosses must rein in their militancy.
The results are more cooperative labor-management relations and more productive employees.
Businesses are thus naturally inclined to locate new jobs in and, when feasible, transfer existing jobs to Right to Work states.
Between 1970 and 2000, non-agricultural employment in Right to Work states increased by 161%, almost triple the 61% increase in non-Right to Work states.
Because so much of Right to Work states' rapid net job growth has been in high-tech, manufacturing, construction, and other well-compensated sectors, their overall personal income growth has been similarly rapid.
Between 1970 and 2000, real personal income in Right to Work states grew by 213%, compared to a 101% increase in non-Right to Work states.
In a more vibrant economy, those just entering the work force find jobs more quickly and can command higher wages when they do.
Therefore, it's not surprising that a far larger share of citizens in non-Right to Work states must depend on federal welfare payments to get by than in Right to Work states.
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in 1998 just 24% of Americans enrolled in the basic federal welfare program lived in Right to Work states, which were then home to 37% of the 50 states' population.
Furthermore, since the most recent wave of state and federal welfare reform began in the early nineties, Right to Work states have made far more rapid progress than non-Right to Work states in cutting poverty as well as welfare rolls.
Between 1990 and 1998, for example, the share of Right to Work state citizens in poverty fell by 11.5%, more than triple the 3.4% decline in non-Right to Work states.
In addition to protecting the freedom of association and promoting economic development, Right to Work laws are an anti-poverty program with a proven record of success.
And they don't cost taxpayers a thing.
In fact, taxpayers stand to gain when families are able to go off welfare, allowing state governments to cut public-assistance dollars out of their budgets.
Officials of most U.S.-based international unions commandeer a large share of workers' forced dues to pay for "in-kind" support for union boss-favored candidates.
Forced dues and "agency fees" finance phone banks, get-out-the-vote drives, and "volunteer" campaign organizing work by union staff who remain on the union payroll.
Federal and state election laws exempt Big Labor from reporting the vast majority of such "in-kind" expenditures.
No one, probably including top union bosses themselves, knows their exact value.
But well-informed political observers agree that the value of the union bosses' hidden forced-dues fund is far greater than that of voluntary reported "soft" contributions to either GOP or Democratic national party committees (now banned under the so-called "Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001").
In July 2001, Big Labor U.S. Rep. John Lewis (D-Ga.) admitted that union bosses and the nonunion groups they bankroll "are contributing to increased . . . turnout [for union-label candidates] much more than is party soft money."
The Weekly Standard, a highly influential political magazine based in Washington, D.C., estimates that, in the 2000 federal campaigns, union bosses funneled $800 million in mostly forced-dues money into electioneering activities.
And most forced dues-paying employees don't back the Tax, Spend & Regulate agenda pushed by union czars.
In fact, 72% of the union-"represented" workers interviewed by pollster John Zogby in a 1999 scientific survey said they disagree with official union positions more often than not!
Big Labor's government-sanctioned confiscation of huge sums of money from workers for its electioneering slush fund is the worst form of political corruption in the United States today.
Making financial support for unions purely voluntary would remove a blot from Delaware's campaign-finance system that is sullying the state's electoral process.
In states without a Right to Work law, a worker's refusal to join or financially support a union he believes or knows to be corrupt can be grounds for dismissal.
It shouldn't be surprising, therefore, that a 93-page scholarly study of union corruption by journalist and labor-policy expert Carl Horowitz found that union corruption is relatively rare in Right to Work states.
As Mr. Horowitz concludes in his monograph, Union Corruption: Why It Happens, How to Combat It, "Union corruption occurs most frequently, and involves greater sums of money, in states without a Right to Work law."
Just since late 1997, five international union presidents – ex-Teamsters czar Ron Carey, the late hotel employees kingpin Ed Hanley Sr., ex-maritime union chief Louis Parise, ex-laborers boss Arthur Coia, and ex-ironworkers honcho Jake West – have been forced out of office after being implicated in felonies.
These five were accused of such crimes as partaking in the embezzlement of forced dues for a reelection campaign, setting up "ghost locals" near union bosses' vacation homes in order to bilk workers for personal expenses, and paying bribes to secure union legal business for a lawyer crony.
The U.S. Labor Department reports that its investigations result in roughly 130 convictions for union financial fraud every year.
Moreover, as Labor Department spokeswoman Sue Hensley has tacitly admitted, many other cases of fraud and embezzlement by union officials are probably going undetected.
Whether they act as individuals or in groups, Delaware employees should have the option of punishing union bosses as soon as they see wrongdoing by withholding their dues money.
This has proven to be by far the most effective means of controlling union corruption.
More than 40 years ago, noted labor-relations scholar Sylvester Petro succinctly explained the need for Right to Work laws to combat union corruption.
No one has ever put it better than Dr. Petro:
"It is as absurd to expect good clean unionism in conditions of extensive compulsory unionism, as it would be to expect good government in a society where the divine right of kings or dictatorship of the proletariat was the central political principle."